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After the political regime in the former Yugoslavia collapsed at the beginning of the 
1990s, followed by the ethnic civil wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Balkans turned into 
an arena for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. As a result, the region 
has posed a potential threat within Europe’s borders and beyond. In 2012, Bulgaria 
became the target of a terrorist attack. Although the attack was directed against Israeli 
interests, the event revealed a breach in Bulgaria’s national security. The purpose of this 
thesis is to illustrate how Bulgaria could develop a strategy to protect itself from such 
terrorist threats. Since this thesis relies on open-source historical data, rather than current 
information, its value-added contribution is the process it demonstrates for collecting and 
analyzing data, as opposed to recommending a particular strategy.    
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A. THE BALKAN CONTEXT 
One of the most serious unresolved issues of the twenty-first century concerning 
national security is terrorism. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New 
York City on 9/11, the attacks in Spain, England, and many other places, have shown that 
threats and risks to international security are global and borderless. The escalation of 
terrorism by religious and ethnic groups seems to be growing.1 In the years after 1990, 
“wars and political instability provided an opportunity for Al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups to infiltrate” many corners of the world, including the Balkans, a region 
characterized by a significant Muslim population, “weak border controls, and security 
services.”2 The Balkan Peninsula has always been a unique and dynamic region. 
Currently, peace in the Balkans is tenuous, a consequence of the ethnic and religious 
conflicts of the last two decades, extremist political leaders, organized crime, 
paramilitaries, and connections to large networks of international terrorist organizations.3 
1. Fertile Ground for Terrorism  
In terms of religion, the presence of a Muslim population in the Balkans “fits in 
well with the global vision of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, which aspire to achieve the 
triumph of Islamic culture over Western culture (and other Islamic foes), and to establish 
the ‘Umma’—the community of faithful Muslims which will unite all Muslims and 
position Islam as the main global force.”4 Thousands of fighters, mainly 
Afghan “alumni,” arrived to fight the Bosnia war, which spread the ideology of radical 
1. Vasil Prodanov and Bogdana Tomova, Risks for Bulgaria of Islamic Fundamentalism and Terrorism 
(Sofia, Bulgaria: Bulgarian Scientific Academy, 2005), 17. 
2. Steven Woehrel, Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans, CRS Report RL33012 (Washington, DC: 
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 26, 2005). 
3. Prodanov and Tomova, Risks for Bulgaria of Islamic Fundamentalism and Terrorism, 14. 
4. Shaul Shay, “Islamic Terror and the Balkans,” in Islamic Terror and the Balkans (New Brunswick, 
NJ and London, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2007), 202. 
 1 
                                                 
Islamic terror over the Muslim population in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia (the 
Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, FYROM).5 
During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a displaced and poor Bosniak 
population and the Bosnian government accepted the help of Iran in terms of money and 
weapons, as well as several thousand Islamic radicals and mercenaries.6 Many of them 
were Mujahidin from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and fighters from Afghanistan.7 
After the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, some of these fighters remained and gained 
citizenship through marriage or by bribing Bosnian officials.8  The importance of Bosnia 
was mentioned by Bin Laden and others in the high ranks of Al Qaeda as a key militant 
Islamic cause.9  Furthermore, Bosniaks received support throughout and after the war. 
Various kinds of assistance, including financial aid, was provided by Islamic charities 
and organizations serving conveniently as fronts for Al Qaeda to plan further attacks in 
Bosnia and elsewhere.10 As a result of a radical Islamic presence in the Balkans, the U.S. 
embassy in Sarajevo as well as U.S. military bases in Bosnia have been targets for 
numerous terrorist threats after 9/11.11 
Bosnia’s dangerously loose internal and border security, in addition to high crime 
rates in Albania in the 1990s, produced an environment conducive for foreign Islamic 
extremists.12 Islamic non-government organizations, some of which were fronts for Al 
Qaeda, were established there after 1991. They participated in the organized attack on the 
U.S. embassy in Tirana in 1998, resulting in the arrests of several Al Qaeda members.13  
5. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, introduction. 
6. Woehrel, Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans, 3. 
7. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, introduction. 







                                                 
The involvement of Islamic terror organizations in Kosovo began in 1998 through 
the contribution of established terror organizations in Bosnia and Albania.14 They 
operated in two main ways by first establishing a network of charities serving as financial 
support, and secondly by incorporating fighters in combat units alongside the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA).15 Similar to the conflict in Bosnia, Islamic charities in Kosovo 
served as a channel for transferring financial aid to the Muslims in Kosovo, and as a 
cover for terrorist activities.16 Also, during the war in Kosovo, evidence indicates that 
“Islamic instructors” arrived in Kosovo in 1998 from Bosnia, and that members of other 
terror organizations (e.g., Al Qaeda, the Yemenite organization, the Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad) participated in the fight together with KLA.17 There is evidence that these foreign 
volunteers operated not only in Kosovo, but also helped the separatist Islamic terror 
organizations in Macedonia.18 
Macedonia, a country mainly divided between Muslim Albanians (30 percent of 
the population) and Orthodox Christians can be considered as another suitable area for 
the spread of the ideas and movements of radical Islam in the Balkans.19 Due to its 
internal problems created by the combination of ethnic and religious disputes, its 
economy, and its political weaknesses, Macedonia has become a country that is 
significantly influenced by outside players such as Albania and Muslims in Kosovo.20 
The first evidence of radical Islam in Macedonia was the arrest of a terrorist (with 
Mujahidin rank), who attempted to detonate an explosive device in a police station in 
Skopje in 1999.21 In subsequent years, other evidence in Macedonia surfaced showing 
14. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 88. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid., 89. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid., 90. 
19. Ibid., 112. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid., 113. 
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that some organizations and charities have provided significant support for the creation of 
radical Islam in terms of manpower (Mujahidin), weapons, and funding.22  
2. Emergence of Criminalization  
From an organized crime perspective, the Balkans can be characterized as a 
suitable region for the trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people. The criminalization 
process in the Balkans can be described as a result of two basic conditions:23 
• The wars in the former Yugoslavia led to a high level of poverty, 
corruption and a low level of foreign investments; 
• Countries in the Balkans are a “bridge” to illegal ties connecting Europe 
with Asia and Africa, due to the weak border control implemented by 
weak governments. 
The economies of the countries in the Balkans can be characterized as some of the 
worst economies in Europe.24 This poor economic environment, connected with 
continuing ethnic hatred, has led some people to join existing criminal organizations.25 
Exemplified by Max Weber’s “loss of the monopoly over power,” different armed groups 
or criminals have penetrated government structures in these countries to influence others 
to achieve their own purposes.26 The inefficiency of governments and law enforcement 
institutions in terms of low detection or proper prosecution of criminals has led to weak 
border control.27 As a result of these economic and political weaknesses, the Balkans has 
become an ideal location “for the purchase and sale of illicit goods, including weapons, 
and transit for terrorists and their recruiters.”28 
22.  Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 113. 
23. Sheila Rom, “Instability and Desperation: The Balkan Link to Terrorism,” Global Security  
Studies l, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 101–110. 
24. According to the CIA Factbook, Kosovo has the worst economy in Europe, with the highest 
unemployment rate, as the Bosnian national GDP decreased significantly during the war. Rom, “Instability 
and Desperation.” 
25. Rom, “Instability and Desperation.” 
26. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 88. 
27. Rom, “Instability and Desperation.” 
28. Ibid. 
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To summarize, although there have been efforts to stabilize security in these 
countries over the last ten years, the Balkans still must be considered as an area of great 
interest to international terrorist structures. As Shaul Shay states, “the terror infrastructure 
and radical Islam in the Balkans pose a threat, not only to stability in the Balkans, but 
constitute a danger of subversion and terror throughout the European continent and 
beyond it.”29  
B. RADICAL ISLAM AND TERRORISM IN BULGARIA 
In recent years, some research has claimed that Bulgaria is not directly threatened 
by terrorists or Islamic fundamentalists.30 According to this research, moderate Islam as 
well as amity amongst different ethnic and religious groups exists without jihad.31 
However, Bulgaria is an integral part of the Balkans and is not an exception to the threat 
of terror and criminality the region faces.32 In late 1995, for example, there is evidence 
indicating that after the Dayton Accords, Ayman al-Zawahiri moved Al-Qaida 
headquarters in the Balkans from Bosnia-Herzegovina to a Sofia suburb in Bulgaria.33 In 
mid-November 1995, about 20 senior Islamist commanders met to discuss “the new wave 
of operation in the aftermath of Fuad Talat Qassim’s August arrest in Zagreb and 
extradition to Cairo,34 where he was tortured and likely executed. On November 20, 
1995, these Islamists “announced” the emergence of their center in Bulgaria, sending a 
gunman to open fire on the Egyptian Embassy—a reminder to the Egyptian government 
not to look too closely at the Islamists’ activities in Sofia.”35 In the beginning of 1996, 
29. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 170. 
30. Prodanov, Risks for Bulgaria of Islamic Fundamentalism and Terrorism, 92. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Bulgarian Government website, “Bulgarian National Counterterrorism Plan, 2008,” 
http://www.strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=497 
33. Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden, the Man Who Declared War on America (Rocklin, CA: Prima 
Publishing, 1999), 155. 
34. According to Bodansky: “Qassim was one of Zawahiri’s closest personal friends, and his 1995 
extradition to Egypt had been a festering wound.” 
35. Bodansky, Bin Laden, the Man Who Declared War on America, 155. 
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Zawahiri found Bulgaria as safe place for his activities; he organized travel for 42 
Egyptian activists to Bulgaria in order to conduct attacks against Western targets.36   
As early as 1992, Bulgaria fell among the countries and territories facing radical 
Islamists who have undergone jihad—training or experience in real battles.37 Currently, 
there is a trial against 13 Muslim clerics who are accused of preaching radical Islam, anti-
democratic ideology, as well as provoking religious hatred.38 Some of the clerics are 
accused of membership in the Islamist Foundation Organization Al Waqf al Islami where 
registration as a religious group has been denied in Bulgaria.39 According to Alex 
Alexiev, the link with Al Waqf al Islami40 is the clearest factor to judge that the 
defendants are radical Islamists, because “its leadership has well-proven links not only 
with Islamist, but also with terrorist circles.”41 He also noted that the money the imams in 
Bulgaria have generated should not be underestimated and the fight against radical Islam 
must start by tracing the “enormous funds” that finance Muslim centers in the country.42 
On July 18, 2012, in Burgas Airport in Bulgaria, a terrorist attack was carried out 
against a bus with 42 Israeli tourists.43 This attack resulted in five Israelis killed as well 
as the Bulgarian bus driver and 32 injured.44 According to Alex Alexiev, Bulgaria is 
threatened by radical Islam because “our country is also seen as part of the Western 
world as well as part of unbelievers who must be destroyed.”45   
36. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 142. 
37. Prodanov, Risks for Bulgaria of Islamic Fundamentalism and Terrorism, 15. 
38. News.bg, “The Trial Against the Imams Continues” (2013), accessed June 10, 2013, 
http://news.ibox.bg/news/id_281519771  
39. Ibid. 
40. “This is one Wahhabis organization, financed by Saudi in Eindhoven, The Netherlands. Its 
mosque, Al Furqaan, is widely known as a center of propaganda and funding of religious extremism in the 
whole Europe.”  
41. Alex Alexiev, “Radical Islam Has Occurred throughout Bulgaria,” OFFNews.bg, December 2012, 
http://offnews.bg/index.php/132029/aleks-aleksiev-radikalen-islyam-sheta-v-balgariya. 
42. Ibid.  
43. Wikipedia, “Burgas Bus Bombing,” 2012, http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Burgas_bus_bombing 
44. Ibid.  
45. Alexiev, “Radical Islam Has Occurred throughout Bulgaria.”  
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C. FOUNDATION FOR CURRENT COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
FOR BULGARIA  
As a member of the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly 
in NATO, the Republic of Bulgaria has entered into the scope of geostrategic interests of 
Islamic fundamentalism. The Bulgarian counterterrorism strategy, therefore, must factor 
in a number of issues:46 
• Bulgaria is geographically located in the immediate vicinity of the Islamic 
world as it connects Muslim countries from Asia with Europe; 
• Bulgaria has a significant number of Muslim populations with historical 
roots and ethnic consciousness, mainly from Bulgarian, Turkish and 
Romani origin (in 2001, Muslims comprised 12.2 percent of the 
population of Bulgaria).  
• Bulgaria is an eastern border of the Europe Union; 
• There is the presence in the country of individual supporters of terrorist 
organizations and their radical formation, as well as their political and the 
religious beliefs;  
• As a member of NATO, Bulgaria participates and continues to participate 
in the existing peacekeeping missions not only in the Balkans, but also in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, etc.47 
• Activities of religious foundations and other non-governmental 
organizations among the Bulgarian Muslim community aim to consolidate 
extreme forms of Islam;   
• The internal criminal contingent in Bulgaria, and more specifically 
organized crime, has possible links with terrorist structures;  
• The main financial support for the spread of radical Islam comes from 
petrol-rich countries from the Middle East which have a huge role for the 
dissemination of radical Islam.48  
Bulgaria, an ally of the United States in NATO, actively participates in military 
missions and operations for supporting world peace and in combat against international 
terrorism. In addition, as a member of the European Union, the country actively adheres 
to the policy and strategies of the Union in its anti-crime and counterterrorism fight. 
46. Bulgarian Government website, “Bulgarian National Counterterrorism Plan, 2008,” 
http://www.strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=497. 
47. Ministry of Defense of Republic Bulgaria website, “Missions and Operations,” 
http://www.mod.bg/bg/tema_MissionsOperations.html. 
48. Alexiev, “Radical Islam Has Occurred throughout Bulgaria.”  
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According to the National Counterterrorism Plan, specific elements of Bulgarian foreign 
policy are:49 
• The interaction of Bulgaria with the partners of the European Union and 
NATO allies in  joint fight against terrorism; 
• The coordination, within the framework of the European Union, a 
common policy in the fight against terrorism in third countries and within 
the framework of international organizations; 
• The implementation of the European Union strategy to combat terrorism 
and all its updates effective control of radicalization and prevention of 
terror recruitment networks, protection of critical infrastructure sites, 
intersection of channels and the mechanisms for the financing of terrorist 
activities, and prevention of the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes; 
• Bulgaria’s cooperation with the Council of Europe and Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); the ratification of the 
European Convention for the suppression of terrorism and the Convention 
for the prevention of terrorism, and the Convention against terrorism 
financing; 
• Bulgaria’s contribution, together with NATO allies and other partners, to 
NATO missions in different countries for recovery of statehood, validation 
of democracy and counteracting terrorist attempts made to destabilize 
societies in these countries; 
• Global planning of Bulgaria’s efforts directed at implementation of the 
UN Security Council’s resolution to combat terrorism; 
At the national political level, coordination of the activities in the fight against 
terrorism is carried out by the Council for Security at the Council of Ministers, which 
organizes and coordinates the activities of the ministries and departments in connection 
with national security including the fight against terrorism.50  
At the operational level in the fight against terrorism, the Coordinating Center for 
Countering International Terrorism (CCCIT) in the National Security State Agency 
(DANS) functions as a national coordinator on the combat against terrorism.51  CCCIT 
implements interaction with other structures involved in the fight against terrorism, 
specifically security structures in the country as well as with the special foreign services, 




                                                 
and it centralizes all received operational and technical information.52 Also, the 
Coordinating Center carries out a systematic analysis of the risk of terrorist threats 
(including threats resulting from activities of Islamic radical groups) and formulates 
synthesized and prognostic data.53  
D. PURPOSE OF THESIS: DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERTERRORISM 
STRATEGIES FOR BULGARIA  
This thesis derives potential strategies that Bulgaria could use to fight terrorist 
networks operating not only in its territory, but also in the entire area in the Balkans. 
These strategies are derived from new methods for collecting and analyzing data on 
terrorist networks. However, the data-driven strategies only serve as a demonstration of 
what could be done, not what should be done. Until data on Bulgarian terrorism can be 
updated and integrated with classified documents, the results should not be taken as a 
recommendation for current action.  
E. THESIS STRUCTURE  
Chapter II reviews the literature on counterterror strategies. This chapter outlines 
military strategies (both kinetic and non-kinetic) as well as non-military strategies, such 
as law enforcement activities, amnesty programs, development, and financial 
interventions.  
Chapter III summarizes the thesis methodology. The data used for analyzing 
networks is collected from open-source documents. It consists of people affiliated with 
terrorist groups in the Balkans, their activities and their connections with criminal 
organizations in the region. Once collected, the data are uploaded into Palantir for coding 
and structuring. After some initial analysis, the data are exported to additional software 
packages to conduct in-depth geospatial, temporal, link and social network analysis.   
52. Bulgarian government website, “Bulgarian National Counterterrorism Plan, 2008.” 
53 Ibid. 
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Chapter IV presents the results of the data analysis. The chapter begins with 
results from geospatial and temporal analysis. It then transitions to link analysis and 
culminates in social network analysis.   
Chapter V discusses the results of the analyses. It then identifies three alternative 
strategies to disrupt the Balkan networks. Based on a comparative analysis, one strategy 
is recommended to counter terrorism in the Balkans. 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis, summarizes the findings and recommendations, 
and recommends follow-on research.  
 10 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF COUNTERTERRORISM 
STRATEGIES 
Three decades ago, terrorists wanted to elicit public sympathy in order to achieve 
their ideology-motivated goals.54 After the Cold War, the number of terror attacks 
significantly increased. Terrorism also has changed its form and nature and now is 
directed “against civilians, not governments or their institutions” in order to achieve its 
political and economic goals.55 The process of globalization led to the establishment of 
“network-centric terror organizations.”56 Their objectives have broadened by the 
expansion of their activities and include the distribution of the world’s resources and the 
destruction of Western countries mainly by threatening human security.57 Terrorists have 
evolved in their abilities to use the new technologies and in their tactics; they are well 
trained and equipped; often they rely on criminal and illegal activities.58 As a result they 
have been able to achieve mass casualty attacks throughout the world, such as attacks of 
September 11, London bombing, and Madrid bombing.  
Today there is not a single strategy to combat terrorism, or a common theory of 
anti-terrorists operations, because a strategy can be effective in the fight with a particular 
terror group, operating in a particular region, but it might not work against another one.59 
Consequently, a strategy has to be based on both “particularly the nature of the 
government under attack and the most important operational features of the relevant 
 
 
54 . Mikhail Rykhtik, “Asymmetric Threats and Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Russia,” in National 
Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal, Institutional, and Public Policies Dimensions in the U.S., UK, 
France, Turkey, and Russia, ed. Robert Orttung and Andrey Makarychev (Washington, DC: The NATO 
Programme for Security through Science: IOS Press, 2006), 167. 
55. Rykhtik, “Asymmetric Threats and Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Russia,” 167. 
56. Ibid. 
57.  Ibid. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: 
Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgencies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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terrorist groups.”60 As a result, for the purpose of this approach we separate general 
counterterrorism strategies into two main groups: military strategies and non-military 
strategies. 
A. MILITARY STRATEGIES 
There are various centers for collecting and analyzing data about “dark networks 
i.e., illegal and covert networks.”61 Although much attention has been paid to the 
collection of data connected with dark networks, there are not so many sources exploring 
and comparing strategies for disruption of these networks in terms of “balancing their 
potential gains with their likely potential costs.”62 Furthermore, focusing on capturing 
and eliminating “designated high value targets” is not a silver bullet, because as General 
Flynn and his coauthors have claimed, “merely killing insurgents usually serves to 
multiply enemies rather than subtract them.”63 Consequently, strategies focused on 
population also have to be considered.64 To provide some coherence among the different 
military strategies, Roberts and Everton (2011)65 offered a framework that organized 
generic strategies into two main types: Kinetic and Non-kinetic.66  The former is based 
on force measures to “eliminate or capture network members and their supporters and 
employs the usage of bombs and bullets to pursue the campaign.”67 The latter is not 
based on “bombs and bullets” but rather applies non-coercive means to neutralize dark 
networks, such as “the reconstruction of war-torn areas, intelligence, and psychological 
operations.”68 
60. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
61. Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” Journal of Social 
Structure 12 (2011): 2, www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12/RobertsEverton.pdf. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid., 3. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Since the rehabilitation strategy of the Roberts and Everton structure of strategies is not military, I 
removed it to the non-military strategies section of this chapter. 




                                                 
The kinetic strategies are aggressive actions aimed at neutralizing, capturing or 
eliminating terrorists and their supporters by removing key actors in a network, or by 
disrupting “key ties or links among individuals, groups or organizations.”69 Based on 
that, Roberts and Everton divide kinetic strategies into targeting and capacity-building 
strategies.70 The former can be conducted in three ways: Person-Targeting (“man-hunting 
operations”), Group-Targeting (operations concentrated on teams, groups, or subsets of a 
particular terror network) and Organization-Targeting (operations focused on an entire 
terror organization).71 The latter is focused on “training and advising host-nation security 
forces to become a professional force.”72 
The Non-kinetic strategy, in turn, involves less aggressive means aimed to 
undermine terror networks “more with the diplomatic and economic tools of national 
power than with the military forces.”73 There are different means for leading this 
strategy, which can be allied for the purpose of this thesis and are as follows: 
• Institution-Building strategy uses “Civil Affairs forces that provide 
humanitarian and civic” support for reconstruction of the countries after 
the war (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, etc.), which can be achieved 
by “building healthy host-government institutions of governance, rule of 
law, and economic development.”74 
• Psychological Operations practice the dissemination of information for 
influencing the behavior of population of a country, counterterrorist 
propaganda in terms of spreading “disaffection and dissidence among 
adversaries to reduce their will to fight and ultimately to induce their 
surrender.”75 
  





74. Ibid., 5. 
75. Ibid., 6. 
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• Information Operations are based on “electronic warfare and computer 
network operations to combat terrorism.”76 The former is used “to control 
the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the adversary.”77 The latter is 
used for supporting military operations to control networked computers 
and IT systems. Both operations can be used “to attack, deceive, degrade, 
and disrupt information operations capabilities and to deny, exploit, and 
defend electronic information and infrastructure.”78 
Both generic approaches can be applied to a country or a group outside one’s 
borders.79 For an example, Bulgaria could pursue both approaches toward disrupting 
terrorist networks that operate within its territory and outside its borders in neighboring 
countries (e.g., the Balkans). These strategies also can be pursued with other countries. 
Furthermore, the Kinetic and Non-kinetic approaches to countering terrorism can be 
developed using social network analysis to highlight terrorist networks.80  
B. NONMILITARY STRATEGIES 
Although, the use of military force has an essential role in the fight against 
terrorism,81 Ami Pedahzur argues that “the war model,” conducted not only by Israel but 
also by other countries for combating terrorism, is “flawed not only because it 
undermines civil liberties, as many have argued in the past, but also because it is 
unsuitable for the challenges of terrorism and causes the security establishment to deviate 
from dealing with other, more imminent threats.”82 He recommends that politicians 
should consider the fact that the terrorism is a form of “psychological warfare” led by 
paramilitary forces, and as a result counterterror strategies should be transformed in a 
“defensive model.”83  In addition, in order to address terrorism adequately governments 




80. Ibid., 7. 
81. William C. Banks, Renee de Nevers, and Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Combating Terrorism, Strategies 
and Approaches (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 327. 
82. Ami Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services & the Struggle against Terrorism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 135. 
83. Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services & the Struggle against Terrorism, 144. 
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need to “understand the role of non-state actors, including criminals, as a threat to state 
security,”84 because “criminals and terrorists intersect in many ways.”85 As a result, non-
military approaches should be considered as well. They can be achieved by: 
• law enforcement 
• amnesty program 
• winning public support 
• development strategy 
• financial strategy 
1. Law Enforcement 
As the senior UN official in Kosovo Bernard Kouchner said, “The lesson of 
Kosovo was that peacekeeping missions need to arrive with a law-and-order kit made up 
of trained police, judges, and prosecutors and a set of draconian security laws. This is the 
only way to stop criminal behavior from flourishing in a vacuum of authority.”86 
Statistically, regarding the effectiveness of law enforcement “as of mid-2003, the police 
in over 100 countries had arrested more than 3,000 suspects linked to al -Qaeda, while 
the military had captured only 650 enemy combatants.”87 Police, unlike soldiers, are the 
main link between a local population and the government security institutions, and 
usually provoke less stress when applying their tactics—regular patrols, surveillance, 
patient observation, establishing a bond with the community leadership, tracking terror 
networks and individuals, information gathering about terrorists rather than the use of 
soldiers with their “search-and-destroy” or mass detention operations.88 Another 
important function of law enforcement is to “disrupt terrorist financing that includes by 
uncovering links between terrorists and organized criminal groups. Many modern 
84. Louise Shelley, “Countering Terrorism in the U.S.: The Fallacy of Ignoring the Crime—Terror 
Nexus,” in National Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal, Institutional, and Public Policies Dimensions in 
the U.S., UK, France, Turkey, and Russia, ed. Robert Orttung and Andrey Makarychev (Washington, DC: 
The NATO Programme for Security  through Science: IOS Press, 2006), 212.  
85. Shelley, “Countering Terrorism in the U.S.: The Fallacy of Ignoring the Crime – Terror Nexus,” 
203. 
86. Ibid., 210. 
87. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
88. Ibid. 
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terrorist groups, like some insurgents, derive substantial funds from narcotics trafficking 
and other illicit activities.”89 Furthermore, the deterrence effect of law enforcement could 
be a useful tool to combat terrorism by demonstrating that the government under attack is 
able to judge suspected terrorists, or to prevent others from joining to terrorism.90 In 
addition, law enforcement can be used to reduce terrorist recruitment by disrupting places 
where such activities occur.91 This can be achieved by monitoring and/or closing radical 
mosques and schools;92 for instance, in France police and security services have an 
access to all kinds of data and can use all forms of interception, physical surveillance, 
monitoring of speeches, sermons and literature from Salafist mosques, and other Islamic 
fundamentalist activities in the country, which have resulted in the arrests of dozens 
Islamic fundamentalists.93  
2. Amnesty Programs 
This counterterrorism strategy is expressed by dividing a terrorist group into 
subgroups.94 This can be achieved by amnesty programs (that encourage defections 
among terrorists), division of a group into different ethnic, tribes and national 
components, if it consists of such, and empowering Islamic moderates, etc.95  Also, 
rehabilitation can be used to influence “moderate preachers to counsel terrorists and to 
instill in them a more balanced view of Islamic teaching.”96 
89. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
90. Banks, Combating Terrorism, Strategies and Approaches, 138. 
91. Lynn E. Davis and Melanie W. Sisson, A Strategic Planning Approach: Defining Alternative 
Counterterrorism Strategies as an Illustration (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 12. 
92. Davis and Sisson, A Strategic Planning Approach: Defining Alternative Counterterrorism 
Strategies as an Illustration, 12. 
93. Gary J. Schmitt, “France: In a League of Its Own,” in Safety, Liberty, and Islamist Terrorism: 
American and European Approaches to Domestic Counterterrorism, ed. Gary J. Schmitt (Washington, DC: 
The AEI Press, 2010), 111. 
94. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies.  
95. Ibid. 
96. Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 6. 
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3. Winning Public Support 
In many cases, most terrorists and insurgents are dependent on the population not 
only for logistical support in the sense of information, food, shelters, but also for 
employing recruits.97 As a result, winning public support is an important strategy for both 
host and foreign countries in order to reduce terrorist activities, although it would not 
have instant effect.98 This strategy can be accomplished through different campaigns, 
such as:99 
• Influence campaigns aimed at both religious leaders, who play a vital role 
in the recruitment process and deliver religious justification for 
violence,100 and local political leaders “in order to undermine the 
credibility of religious and ideological justifications for suicide and the 
killing of innocents and Muslims.”101 Such a campaign should be done by 
carefully and discretely funding a leader or a group.102 
• Influence campaigns showing Western values. Economic policies could 
create business partnerships with “Muslim business leaders who 
appreciate the benefits of cooperation with Western institutions” in order 
to support “moderate Muslim elites as well as acquiring information about 
their extremist rivals.”103 Furthermore, campaigns to influence the broader 
Muslim population, for example, the U.S. disaster relief campaign to 
Muslims after the December 2004 Asian Pacific Tsunami demonstrated 
“U.S. concern to alleviate Muslim suffering” and led to weakening public 
“support for terrorism in many Muslim countries.”104 
  
97. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
98Ibid. 
99Ibid. 
100. Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, “Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 5‒22. 
101. Davis and Sisson, A Strategic Planning Approach: Defining Alternative Counterterrorism 
Strategies as an Illustration, 11. 
102. Brachman and McCants, “Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook,” 5‒22.  
103. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons 
Learned from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
104. Ibid. 
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• De-legitimizing terrorism using a strategy showing that genocide, piracy 
and slavery are outcomes of terrorism, which “are now considered beyond 
the bounds of proper behavior.”105  Also, it has to highlight distortion 
activities of Islam extremists and their sacred principles in order to 
discredit their propaganda and to empower moderate Muslims.106 This can 
be achieved by funding effective media campaigns, “but in a very low key 
and indirect manner,” to turn “Muslim public opinion against the 
jihadists” by “broadcasting images of jihadi attacks that have killed 
Muslim children.”107 Rather, a message showing that jihadists have killed 
thousands of Muslims and non-Muslims might provoke negative public 
opinion toward terrorists.108   
4. Development Strategy  
Since international terrorism is considered as a political act, and no country can 
overcome it on its own, diplomatic cooperation between countries is “the cornerstone of a 
comprehensive, long-term, international counterterrorism strategy that seeks to politically 
discredit, operationally disrupt, and eventually defeat the most violent groups.”109 The 
indirect support of foreign governments is needed to fight with terrorists, because as 
defense analysts Steven Metz and Raymond Millen have noted about contemporary 
counterterrorism, “the key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at 
counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and other elements of government) to be 
skilled at helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at it.”110 As a 
result the United States, for example, has supported friendly governments by 
providing training, intelligence and financial aid in order to improve their counterterror 
105. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
106. Ibid. 
107. Brachman and McCants, “Stealing Al Qaeda’s Playbook,” 19. 
108. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
109. Michael A. Sheehan, “Diplomacy,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. 
Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 98. 
110. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
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abilities.111 This type of U.S government policy can have beneficial effects against 
terrorists, such as:112 
• Improvements in intelligence, law enforcement and military defense 
capability; 
• Promotion of political and economic reforms. “Strengthening secular 
education” and discrediting radical Islam and anti-Western propaganda; 
• Creation of a multinational coalition to combat terrorism, which is able to 
control WMD proliferation and support multilateral anti-terrorism 
intelligence sharing. In addition, international cooperation is significantly 
important to limit the support from states to terrorists,113 and can be 
achieved by political, moral and economic pressure on these states.114 
5. Financial Strategy 
The knowledge, gained from past counterterrorism actions, shows that any 
terrorist group depends on support across the borders. For instance, the Japanese Red 
Army directed such activities against Israel for the Palestinians. IRA operators provided 
training support to the FARC in Columbia.115  Nowadays, “not only is the al-Qaeda 
network inherently multinational, but even terrorist groups that conduct strikes inside a 
single country rely on transnational support,”116 which usually “comes from some states, 
charity associations, and donations ostensibly for humanitarian purposes that are then 
transferred to terrorists organizations.”117 As a result, a strategy for interrupting financial 
support for terrorists is important.118 This strategy can be achieved by decreasing “the 
availability of informal and illegal mechanisms of funds transfer, including implementing 
111. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
112. Ibid. 
113. Ibid. 
114. Rykhtik, “Asymmetric Threats and Counter – Terrorism Strategies in Russia,” 173. 
115. Campbell and Weitz, Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgencies. 
116. Ibid. 
117. Rykhtik, Asymmetric Threats and Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Russia, 173 
118. Davis and Sisson, A Strategic Planning Approach: Defining Alternative Counterterrorism 
Strategies as an Illustration, 11. 
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regulatory mechanisms to monitor charitable donations and increasing efforts to detect 
money laundering, black market activity, and drug trade.”119  
C. SUMMARY 
International terrorism is constantly evolving in its tactics and strategies. 
Consequently, counterterrorism strategies have to evolve as well.120 In order to develop 
an effective strategy, the first step is to collect data on the threats, identify groups 
responsible for the threats, and investigate what behavior, trends and vulnerabilities each 
group presents since different approaches are needed for different terror organizations.121  
In selecting a strategy both military and nonmilitary strategies need to be 
considered, with the full understanding that it is possible to combine them,122 as long as 
resources are available. In addition, any counterterror strategy has to consider “the 
balance between values such as civil liberties, and the empowering of law enforcement 
agencies at home, as well as the balance between rigorous counterterrorism and 
international law abroad.”123 
This thesis demonstrates a process for selecting a strategy or a combination of 
strategies that Bulgaria could pursue in order to fight terrorism in the Balkans. Most 
importantly, it illustrates how a strategy could emerge from a careful analysis of networks 
operating over the last two decades in the Balkans.    
119. Davis and Sisson, A Strategic Planning Approach: Defining Alternative Counterterrorism 
Strategies as an Illustration, 11. 
120. Audrey K. Cronin, “Conclusion: Toward an Effective Grand Strategy,” in Attacking Terrorism, 
ed. Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 285. 
121. Ibid. 
122. Ibid., 293. 
123. Ibid., 297. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the research process used to answer the thesis question. 
The process consists of three basic steps: data collection and data structuring; data 
analysis; strategy development and strategy selection.   
B. NETWORK DATA COLLECTION AND DATA STRUCTURING   
Since Bulgaria is located in the Balkans, the main part of the analysis examines 
the terror networks operating not only in the country, but also in other countries in the 
region. Most of the terror networks analyzed in this approach were formed after the 
collapse of Yugoslavia, basically during the wars in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with a strong support from outside the borders of the Balkans. In order to track and 
analyze the evolution of radical Islamic terrorist organizations operating in the Balkans, 
the first step was to collect the data.  
The collected data documents terror events that occurred in the Balkans from 
1990 to present day (2013) and are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database and Jane’s 
database. The data consist of about 755 events, information about the types of events, 
dates of events, as well as their geographical coordinates. Geospatial data sets also were 
collected from DIVA GIS and Narodov Mira Greg. In addition, data about the people and 
organizations connected to terrorist groups operating in the Balkans were drawn from 
English and Bulgarian books, news and journals. All data was then uploaded into a 
program called Palantir for coding and structuring necessary to perform the analysis 
described below.  
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C. DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis is a crucial step in developing a counterterrorism strategy124 at the 
national and even at a tactical level.125 The latter is important in the process of tracking 
terrorist activities because terror networks rely heavily on their local cells that operate 
tightly together with limited information of the larger organization.126   
Currently, there are many data collection techniques for fighting terrorist 
organizations. This thesis uses geospatial analysis, temporal analysis, link analysis and 
social network analysis.  
1. Geospatial and Temporal Analysis 
Two software packages were used to conduct geospatial analysis—Palantir and 
ARC-GIX. Palantir’s visualization of terror events revealed the pattern of terrorist events 
over time, their geospatial distribution through time and their relationship to the ethnic 
distribution in the Balkans.   
2. Link Analysis 
Link analysis is a method of analyzing networks consisting of different types of 
entities (for example, people, buildings, cars, locations, events) and different ties between 
them.127 In this case, Palantir was useful in creating an overall picture of how people and 
organizations are interconnected by events and activities.   
3. Social Network Analysis 
After structuring and conducting the initial analysis in Palantir, the data were 
exported to Social Network Analysis (SNA) programs. In contrast to Link Analysis, SNA 
is focused on ties between similar objects (for example, people, organizations) in order to 
124. Lawrence Cline, “Intelligence and Combating Terrorism,” in Fighting Back: What Governments 
Can Do about Terrorism, ed. Paul Shemella (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 193.  
125. John J. Le Beau, “Intelligence and Counterterrorism: Examining the Crucial Tools of Secrecy and 
Cooperation,” in Toward a Grand Strategy against Terrorism, ed. Christopher C. Harmon (New York: 
McGraw Hill Companies, 2011), 195. 
126. Ibid., 196. 
127. Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 6. 
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analyze their social interaction patterns and speculate how these patterns affect their 
behavior.128 SNA is a methodology based on mathematics, anthropology, psychology and 
sociology, “where individuals are reduced to nodes and their relationship to links.”129 In 
other words, SNA is based on the assumption that the “behavior of actors is profoundly 
affected by their ties to others; the networks in which they are embedded” affect what 
they do, say, and believe.130 Consequently, SNA provides empirical data to a social 
context.131  
There are a number of SNA programs. This research relies on UCINET, ORA, 
and Pajek, each of which has its strengths and weaknesses.132  UCINET is the most 
popular software for SNA, because it comprehensively assesses measures of network 
topography, actor centrality, identifies subgroups, and also “includes tools for selecting 
subsets of files, merging and stacking datasets,” and allows easy data export and import  
in different formats.133  The other program, Pajek, “does not include as many algorithms 
as UCINET,” however it can handle very large datasets and allows “users to visualize 
networks in two or three dimensions.”134  Unlike UCINET and Pajek,  ORA allows users 
to analyze networks based on “a report containing a series of related measures,” also the 
software “includes features for simulating various scenarios, geospatially analyzing and 
mapping social networks, and creating different useful charts.”135  The disadvantage of 
ORA’s report – based approach is “that sometimes it includes inappropriate metrics for a 
particular network (estimating closeness centrality in a disconnected network) which can 
lead to assumptions that some actors are most important than they really are.”136   For 
128. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 7. 
129. Stuart Koschade, “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence,” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 6, (2006): 589–605. 
130. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 7. 
131. Ibid. 
132. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 49. 
133. Ibid., 50. 
134. Ibid., 62. 
135. Ibid., 69. 
136. Ibid., 70. 
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this research, UCINET and ORA are used to estimate metrics and to manipulate the data, 
while Pajek is used for robust visualizations of the network.137   
The relational data sets were analyzed by using different metric families found in 
the field of SNA, such as network topography, subgroups, centrality measures, brokers 
and bridges in the network.138  
4. Data Fusion 
The final part of data analysis is data fusion where all the results from different 
analysis are combined and aggregated to provide a common operating picture of terror 
networks operating in the Balkans. This picture consists of information about both central 
people (terrorists, politicians, religious leaders, etc.) who are connected to other people in 
the network and central organizations. It also includes information about the location of 
terror events over the period from 1990 to the present. 
D. STRATEGY OPTIONS AND STRATEGY SELECTION 
The final part of the thesis involves strategy development and strategy selection. 
Building on the fused data, three potential counterterrorism strategies surface and are 
considered. The selection of a preferred strategy is based on the following criteria: 
limitation of civil liberties; available resources for implementation; potential threats to 
people and critical infrastructure; limitations of implementation; and potential 
effectiveness of strategies. Utilizing the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) as a decision 
making tool, one strategy is recommended to counter terrorism in the Balkans.  
137. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 74. 
138.  Ibid., 8–14. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how to analyze the collected and 
structured data about terror networks. It consists of four analytical steps: geospatial, 
temporal, link, and social network analysis (SNA). The final part of this chapter is a data 
fusion of all analyses in order to create a common operational picture139 about the modus 
operandi of terror networks operating in the Balkans.140 This overview consists of 
information about the most important people (terrorists, politicians, religious leaders, 
etc.) and terror organizations, in addition to information about the location of terror 
events over the period in this study. Most importantly, it will inform the development and 
selection of a counterterrorism strategy141 in the next chapter.  
The analysis begins with a review of the ethnic distribution in the Balkans 
countries. As can be seen in Figure 1, the region consists of many ethnic groups.142 In 
addition to ethnicity distribution, religion is spread among the ethnic groups in terms of 
Orthodox Christianity (Serbs, Macedonians, and Bulgarians), Catholicism (Slovenians 
and Croatians), and Islam (Bosnians, Muslim Bulgarians, and Albanians).143 As a result, 
the Balkans has been historically regarded as a “transit area, [a] bridge between different 
cultural worlds, and as a range through which people, ideas and merchandise passed.”144 
139. Common Operational Picture (COP) offers a standard overview of an incident, providing incident 
information that enables the Incident Commander and any supporting agencies to make effective decisions. 
140. Common Operational Picture (ArcGIS 10), ArcGIS, 
http://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=1d90b418b78e40158914bd5178b6892f. 
141. Ibid. 




                                                 
 
Figure 1.  Ethnic distribution in the Balkans. The image was created through the use 
ArcGIS software programs. 
After the collapse of Yugoslavia and the ensuing ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, 
the area “became a focal point of attraction to Islamic terror entities.”145 During the civil 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992‒1995) several thousand warriors, mainly Afghan 
“alumni” and Al Qaida members arrived there to fight against the Serbs and also to train 
“Muslim Bosnian fighters.”146 They formed Mujahidin brigades with the support of Ilia 
Izetbegovic—a leader of Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Muslim leader in 
145. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, xi. 
146. Ibid. 
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Bosnia.147 Also, Muslims in Bosnia received significant support from Iran.148 After the 
end of the Bosnian war, although Mujahidin units were disbanded, a thousand of these 
foreign fighters stayed in Bosnia.149 Their presence combined with corruption, low 
government power and weak public security has made Bosnia a haven for criminals and 
terrorists.150 Furthermore, Islamic terror influence has spread into Kosovo and in 
Macedonia as well.151 As a result, the Balkans Islamic extremist activities have turned 
the area into a platform from which to threaten global security.152 For example, there is 
evidence of links to the September 11 attacks, the “Millennium” attacks and terrorist 
activities in France, Germany, Britain, Spain and Italy.153 
A. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 
Based on the Global Terrorist Database (GTD) data set, Palantir visualized 
temporally these terror events committed in the Balkans from 1991‒2013 (Figure 2). The 
data include 755 terror events committed by not only terrorist organizations but by 
individuals. The majority of the terror events were unattributed to a particular group and 
many were random acts of violence connected with sectarian/ethnic conflicts. There is a 
total of 755 events—374 bombings (shown in red), 246 assault attacks (dark blue), 59 
assassinations (blue), 47 facilities and infrastructure attacks, 21 hostage kidnappings 
(Purple), and 1 hijacking.   
  
147. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, xi. 
148. Ibid.  
149. Ibid. 
150. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, xii. 
151. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, xiii. 
152. Ibid. 
153. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 123‒177. 
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  1991        1994                         2000                           2005                                          2013   
Figure 2.  Terror events in the Balkans (1991‒2013). 
As seen in Figure 2, there were relatively few violent events during the time 
period of the Bosnian War from 1992 to1995. From 1991 to 1995 most of the events 
occurred in Bosnia, where over 100,000 civilians and soldiers were killed. Consequently, 
El Mujahedeen terrorist activities were not part of the data since they were officially part 
of the Muslim Bosnian Army until they were forced to disband in accordance with the 
Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.154 After the Bosnian war until the beginning of the 
Kosovo war in February 1998, most terror attacks occurred in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Albania.  
Another spike in terror events was recorded after the Bosnian war and before as 
well as during the war in Kosovo (1998‒1999). Many of the events from this time period 
occurred in Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. In Kosovo, this was a result of the movement of 
many fighters from Bosnia to support their brothers in the KLA, a group that was listed 
as a terrorist organization, but after the war in Kosovo it was disarmed in 1999.155  
  
154. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 39‒73. 
155. Ibid., 81‒86. 
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B. GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS 
A geospatial analysis was conducted of the same terror events used for the 
temporal analysis. Figure 3 is a heat map visualization of those violent attacks. The heat 
map shows the majority of attacks occurred in the Balkans, which are clustered mainly in 
Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia. The largest cluster is in Kosovo, characterized 
by 161 events. The heat map density displays areas with a radius of 10 km. 
 
Figure 3.  Terrorist events in the Balkans (1991‒2013). 
Figure 4 shows terror events committed in Bulgaria over the last two decades. 
According to GTD the total number of terror events is 36, including 25 bombings, 3 
assault attacks, 6 assassinations, 1 hostage kidnapping, and 1 hijacking.156  As seen in the 
visualization of terrorist acts committed in Bulgaria over the last 20 years, there have not 
been a large number of terror activities compared with other Balkan countries. The hot 
156. Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
 29 
                                                 
spot of terror events is in the capital—Sofia, which is the largest city in Bulgaria. There is 
only one religious-based event, which was a bombing attack against a mosque in the city 
of Kazanluk committed in 1996.157 There is an event against the Yugoslav Consulate in 
Sofia, but it was committed by an unknown perpetrator.158  Most of the events are based 
on a political and business agenda.159 Of particular interest to this study is the last terror 
act committed at the airport of Burgas, which was directed by Hezbollah against Israeli 
tourists visiting Bulgaria. 
 
Figure 4.  Terrorist events in Bulgaria (1991‒2013) and Burgas Bombing. 
C. LINK ANALYSIS  
Link analysis is a method of analyzing networks consisting of different types of 
entities (for example, people, buildings, cars, locations, events) and the different ties 
between them.160 In order to conduct a link analysis, the collected data on radical Islam 
terrorist activities over the past 20 years in the Balkans were analyzed.  
  
157. Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
158. Ibid. 
159. Ibid. 
160. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 6. 
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Since the data were based on individuals and organizations dating back to the 
early 1990s, many of the people were subsequently killed or detained, and some of the 
organizations have disbanded; however, in order to determine the modus operandi of 
terrorists over the last two decades they were not eliminated from the data. In total, as can 
be seen in Figure 5, the structured data that the histograms present consists of 260 people, 
35 terrorist organizations and 16 charitable organizations. All of these entities and events 
are connected by 769 links. Figure 6 shows the breakdown of entities, links and events.   
 
Figure 5.  Entities visualized in Palantir histogram. 
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D. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (SNA) 
As can be seen from the temporal analysis, terrorist activities in the Balkans have 
decreased in the late 2000s. This is a result of the presence of NATO and UN forces in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. Since the current data about terrorist activities is classified and most 
terrorists operating in the past have been killed or captured, and terror organizations are 
disbanded, the analysis is based on their past activities and modus operandi in order to 
provide some insights to possible future action. .   
SNA of these data enables a deeper analysis beyond link analysis. SNA focuses 
on ties between similar objects (ties between different people or ties between 
organizations). For this research, SNA is conducted on two levels: 1) the agent level—to 
explore the existing configuration of relations between people involved in terror activities 
in the Balkans and 2) the organizational level—to understand the pattern of interactions 
between different terror organizations. 
1. SNA of Agent-by-Agent Network 
In order to achieve this analysis a one-mode aggregate network is created161 
based on relations between people.162 In addition to one-mode data (agent-by-agent), 
two-mode networks,163 which are known as affiliation networks, were derived.164 SNA 
assumes that if two people participated in the same event or shared the same organization 
(e.g., political, charity, religious, terror, etc.), “they are much more likely to interact with 
one another than two randomly selected people” which can be used as a “source of social 
ties.”165 This assumption can be applied to analysis of the Balkans since the area and 
organizations are not large and people in an organization are most likely to know each 
other. In order to conduct SNA of this network, ORA, UCINET, and Net Draw were 
utilized to obtain basic metrics: network topography, centrality measures, subgroups, 
161. “One-Mode Network is a network that consists of a single set of actors.”  
162. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 402. 
163. “Two-Mode network consists of two sets of actors or one set of actors and one set of events.” 
Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 403. 
164. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 102. 
165. Ibid. 
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brokers, bridges and structural holes. An overall picture of the agent-by-agent network 
based on all connections is displayed in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Agent-by-agent network visualized in NetDraw. 
a. Network Topography Metrics 
The topography of a network illustrates its overall structure, and has a significant 
influence on its members.166 For instance, in more dense networks, there are more links 
between people, meaning “it is easier for people to monitor the behavior of others and 
prevent them from engaging in deviant behavior.” As a result, people are more likely to 
follow the norms and behavior of the network.167 Density of a network is equal to the 
number of actual ties over the number of possible ties of a network.168 Since the ties 
between the actors are aggregated, the network has to be dichotomized before calculating 
166. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 10. 
167. Ibid. 
168. Ibid., 12. 
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its density in order to count only its real ties rather than its valued ties.169 UCINET is 
able to dichotomize the network and calculate density.170 The results in our case are as 
follows: density is 0.049, total number of ties in the network is 3311 and the average 
degree is 12.735.171 The density of the network shows that 4.9 percent of the total 
possible ties in the network exist, which for a network with 260 nodes, means that the 
network is not very dense. This makes sense given that the Balkans have been typically 
used as a “spring board” for jihadists to venture into other countries to stage operations 
(e.g., Millennium Attack, 9/11, Roubaix Gangs, Montreal Terror Cell, etc.)172 The 
average degree, which is “the average number of ties of each actor,” can be used to 
calculate “how ‘dense’ a network is.”173  For this particular network, it is normal for it to 
be sparse, since the network was analyzed for a long period of time (20 years) and most 
of its actors were not constant residents in the Balkans. The average distance of the 
network (Table 1) indicates a higher speed of information diffusion amongst the actors in 
the network, since average distance is the average length between all actors.174 Network 
diameter shows the dispersion of a network, and usually networks with large diameters 
are more decentralized.175  
 







7.000 2.560 0.586 0.808 
Table 1.   Diameter, Average distance and Distance-weighted fragmentation. 
                                                 
169. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 147. 
170. Ibid. 
171. Ibid. 
172. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 123‒177. 
173. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 147. 
174. Ibid., 137. 
175. Ibid. 
Network fragmentation and distance-weighted fragmentation, in turn, “measure 
the degree to which a network is fragmented,” as the former is the number of actors who 
are not connected to each other; the latter measures distance between actors.176 The 
scores demonstrate that the network is not highly fragmented. This signifies that the 
network is cohesive enough to provide support for jihadist activity. A useful tool of 
UCINET measures how the network fragmentation and distance-weighted fragmentation 
is changed by the removal of an actor. The actors whose displacement will fragment the 
network most strongly and change scores the most are shown in Table 2.177 
 
 
Actors Network Changed 
Fragmentation 
Percent Change in 
Fragmentation (%) 
Abdul Qadir Mukhtari 0.609 0.057 
Talaat Fuad Qassem 0.607 0.051 
Khalil Deek 0.602 0.040 
Fateh Kamel 0.600 0.034 
Alija Izetbegovic 0.595 0.016 
Abu - Zubeida 0.592 0.016 
Christophe Caze 0.592 0.016 
Amer Azizi 0.592 0.016 
Osama bin Laden 0.592 0.016 
Ahmed Zuhair Handala 0.592 0.016 
Table 2.   Node-level fragmentation measures. 
Fragmentation scores of all actors of the network are placed in the table which 
enables comparison among the scores. The scores of the actors do not differ greatly from 
the highest to the lowest scores, which means that the actors in the network are well 
connected. Also, the network is not highly centralized, a point that can be supported by 
measuring network centralization (Table 3). 
176. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 138. 
177. Ibid., 145. 
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20.62% 22.93% 5.37% 45.09% 
Table 3.   Centralization scores. 
Table 3 presents network centralization scores. “The larger a centralization index 
is, the more likely it is that a single actor is very central, whereas the other actors are 
not.”178 Network centralization is based on different centrality measures (betweenness, 
closeness, eigenvector and degree)179 and is equal to the “difference between the 
network’s largest centrality score and each actor’s centrality score to estimate variance of 
actor centrality.”180 As can be seen from both scores this network is decentralized, which 
fits the Balkans context, since there have been several terror organizations operating there 
rather than just one. The closeness centralization has high value compared with other 
centralizations, because they were calculated by UCINET based on “reciprocal distance 
between actors” (which can be applied to this network since there are many isolates).181 
Finally, summarizing all topography measures, the agent-by-agent network can be 
characterized as relatively decentralized, “flat,” relatively sparse and relatively highly 
dispersed, with the ability for fast diffusion of information amongst its actors.182 
b. Centrality Measures 
These measures demonstrate the potential power of an actor based on its position 
in the network.183 Degree centrality estimates the number of ties an actor has to other 
actors (number of actor’s ties divided by all actors’ ties) and means that an actor with a 
178. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 152. 
179. These will be explained in the analyses of centrality measures. 
180. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 152. 
181. Ibid., 154. 
182. Ibid., 169. 
183. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 402. 
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high degree of centrality score has more opportunity to directly influence others within a 
network.184 In order to obtain the number of each actor’s ties, the data have to be 
dichotomized and then analyzed (in this case, with UCINET tools).185 Closeness 
centrality assesses how close (on average) each actor is to all other actors, meaning that 
an actor with an elevated closeness centrality score has accessibility within a network, 
has more of an opportunity to directly impact its members and serves as a point for a 
possible rapid diffusion of resources and information.186 To calculate this measure, 
firstly, for a disconnected network (such as this one), the average reciprocal distance 
(ARD) between actors in the network was used.187  
The next centrality measure is betweenness centrality, which measures the 
extent to which each actor is positioned on the shortest route between all other actors in a 
network.188 Simply put, an actor with a high betweenness centrality score implies 
brokerage potential which controls access to information and resources.189 A 
disadvantage of this measure, which has to be taken into account, is that “there is no 
guarantee that two actors will always follow the shortest path between them.”190 The last 
centrality measure is eigenvector centrality, which “assumes that ties to highly central 
actors are more important than ties to peripheral actors.”191 All centrality measures are 




184. Ibid., 207. 
185. Ibid., 213. 
186. Ibid., 207. 
187. Ibid., 217. 
188. Ibid., 210. 
189. Ibid. 
190. Ibid. 
191. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 208. 
192. Ibid., 217. 
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Figure 7 shows the visualized degree of centrality in NetDraw, where actors with 
a higher degree of centrality score appear larger. 
 
Figure 7.  Degree centrality in agent-by-agent network visualized in NetDraw. 
Figure 8 shows visualized closeness centrality in NetDraw, where actors with a 
higher closeness centrality score appear larger. 
 
Figure 8.  Closeness centrality in agent-by-agent network visualized in NetDraw. 
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Figure 9 shows visualized betweenness centrality in NetDraw, where actors with 
higher betweenness centrality scores appear larger. 
 
Figure 9.  Betweenness centrality in agent-by-agent network visualized in NetDraw. 
Figure 10 shows visualized eigenvector centrality in NetDraw, where actors with 
higher eigenvector centrality scores appear larger. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Eigenvector centrality in agent-by-agent network visualized in NetDraw. 
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Finally, summarizing all findings about centrality measures in the agent-by-agent 
network, a conclusion can be made that top-ranked actors in all scores are almost the 
same.  
c. Subgroups 
Social analysis of subgroups in a network is based on identification of dense 
clusters of actors as cohesive subgroups or sub-networks and generally assumes that 
“social interaction is the basis for solidarity, shared norms, identity and collective 
behavior, so people who interact intensively are likely to consider themselves as a social 
group.”193 The analysis of subgroups begins with identifying the components in the 
network, which are “subnetworks in which members are connected to one another but are 
not connected with members of other sub-networks.”194 In this network only weak 
components195 can be identified, rather than strong components, because the network is 
not directed.196 UCINET identified one main weak component consisting of 179 nodes 
(which is 68.8 percent of network). This component can be visualized by NetDraw’s 
tools using different colors (Figure 11). 
193. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 170. 
194. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 171. 
195. “Strong components take into consideration the direction of ties, whereas weak components do 
not.” 
196. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 171. 
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Figure 11.  The main component shown in red as visualized in NetDraw. 
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d. Bridges and Brokers 
Bridges and brokers analyses are based on the idea “that some actors are more 
likely to control the flow of resources than others.”197 In SNA there are different 
approaches to finding these important actors in the process of disrupting the network in 
the Balkans.198 In order to disrupt this particular network, actors called cutpoints199 must 
be identified, because their “removal will disconnect the network or disconnect a 
component of it.”200 By using ORA’s Measure Charts, our analysis identified 24 actors. 
A list of their names can be seen in Table 5.201  
 
Anwar Shaaban Abu Sulaiman al-Makki 
Fateh Kamel Abu Zubair al-Madani 
Ahmed Zuhair Handala Abu el-Maali 
Karim Said Atmani Abul-Hassan al-Madani 
Abu Talal al-Qasimy Adnan Pezo 
Abdul Rashim al- Nashiri Dr. Fatih al-Hasanayn 
Amer Azizi Alija Izetbegovic 
Abderraouf Hannachi Ehsanul Islam Sadequee 
Cristophe Caze Enaam Arnaout 
Ayman al Zawahiri Haroun Rashid Asouat 
Khalil Deek Talaat Fuad Qassem 
Table 5.   Boundary Spanners202 in actor-by-actor network identified by ORA. 
  
197. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 253. 
198. Ibid. 
199. UCINET and NetDraw call them cutpoints, but ORA-boundary spanners. 
200. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 264. 
201. Ibid., 269. 
202. ORA calls the cutpoints actors boundary spanners. 
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Also, the location of these nodes is visualized in ORA’s visualizer, in Figure 12, 
where they are depicted in blue.  
 
Figure 12.  Boundary Spanners of actor-by-actor network visualized in ORA. 
Since the network is well connected and the number of boundary spanners is not 
small, it is possible that the removal of an actor and all of the actors would not likely 
disconnect the entire network.203 Thus, using another algorithm we were able to identify 
“an optimal set of actors, called Key Players, whose removal either disconnects or 
significantly fragments the network.204 Key players can be analyzed in two different 
approaches: one is based on actors whose removal will fragment the network; the other is 
based on those actors, who can be used for information and/or a disinformation diffusion 
campaign (Table 6).205 They are visualized in Figures 13 and 14. 
  
203. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 271. 
204. Ibid., 272. 
205. Ibid. 
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Key Players-Resulting Fragmentation 
0.722 
Reached Criterion 
(No. of distinct persons reached by the 
key Players: 184  (70.8% of network)) 
Anwar Shaaban Ahmed Ressam 
Fateh Kamel Abu Talal al-Qasimy 
Ahmed Zuhair Handala Rasim Delic 
Christophe Caze Abd al Aziz Zaher 
Alija Izetbegovic Abdul Qadir Mukhtari 
Talaat Fuad Qassem Osama bin Laden 
Abdul Qadir Mukhtari Riyad Suleiman Ishak al-Hajiri 
Nezim Halilovic Abu Hamza el-Misri 
Khalil Deek Aabid Hussein Khan 
Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad Omer Behmen 
Table 6.   Key players in actor-by-actor network. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Key players’ Fragmentation visualized in blue and larger size in NetDraw 
depiction of actor-by-actor network. 
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Figure 14.  Key players’ Reached Criterion visualized in blue and larger size in NetDraw 
depiction of actor-by-actor network. 
 
Figure 15.  Actor-by-Actor network in NetDraw (without isolates) visualizing Burgas 
bombing suspects. 
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e. Summary of Agent-by-Agent SNA   
Analyzing the agent-by-agent terror network in the Balkans, the following 
conclusions can be made:  
• During the analysis, no direct connection was found between 
people in Bulgaria and terrorists, who have been present in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. Furthermore, Figure 15 shows 
that the Burgas bombing suspects (Meliad Farah and Hassan El 
Hajj Hassan) are also not connected to the main component of the 
network or to others in the network.  
• Central figures in this network are mainly people who are not 
residents of the Balkans—mostly former fighters from 
Afghanistan, North Africa and the Middle East. Such people 
include: Abdul Qadir Mukhtari (Algerian), Talaat Fuad Qassem 
(leader of Egirtian Gama’a Islamiyya), Fateh Kamel (Algerian-
Canadian), Christophe Caze (French), Osama bin Laden, etc. On 
the other hand, local people found as central actors are Alija 
Izetbegovic (who was President of Bosnia and Herzegovina after 
the war), Sakib Mahmuljin (a general and politician), Mustafa 
Ceric (a Bosnian Muslim cleric), etc. 
• The network is characterized as decentralized. Its decentralized 
structure may be due to the fact that the region is used for training 
and as a spring board for the dissemination of radical Islamic 
ideas—not only in the Balkans, but also in Europe. Also, this 
structure is a result of the fact that many central figures found in 
the analysis are leaders and members of terrorist organizations 
outside the Balkans, such as the Roubaix Group (Christophe Caze 
and Lionel Dumont), Montreal Terror Cell (Karim Said Atmani 
and Ahmed Ressam), Milan Terror Cell (Rachid Fettar and Youcef 
Tanout).206  Also, they are related to carrying out terrorist attacks 
outside the Balkans, most significant of them are the “Millenium” 
Attacks (Ahmed Rasem), 9/11 attack (Muhamad Haider Zamar, 
Nawaf Al-Hamzi, and Khaled al Midhar),207 the USS Cole 
Bombing in Yemen (Abu Asim al-Makki) and the Kenia/Tanzania 
U.S. Embassy Bombings (Abu Hajer al-Iraqi).208 
206. Evan F. Kohlmann, Al Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan – Bosnian Network (New York: 
Berg Press, 2004), 207. 
207. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 123‒177. 
208. Kohlmann, Al Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, 207. 
 47 
                                                 
The main conclusion is that, although a large number of terrorists have been 
detained or killed, the Balkans serve as a potential area for the training of terrorists, the 
spreading of radical Islam and as a springboard for terrorism.209 
2. SNA Organization Level of Analysis  
Social network analysis was also conducted at the organizational level. A one-
mode terror organization-by-organization network was derived from two-mode data 
about charities, terror organizations and other organizations, based on the links between 
people’s affiliations and memberships in these organizations.210 As a result, the one-
mode network with 35 nodes can be seen in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.  One-mode terrorist organization-by-organization network visualized in 
NetDraw. 
209. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 123‒177. 
210. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 76‒135. 
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Similar to SNA on the individual level, the same data analyses were conducted for 
the terror organizations. After dichotomizing the data in UCINET the following network 
topography measures were calculated: density is 0.097, total number of ties in the 
network is 58 and the average degree is 3.314 (Table 7).211 The density of the network 
shows that 9.7 percent of the total possible ties in the network exist, which for a network 
with 35 nodes means that the network is not very dense. 
 







5.000 2.447 0.464 0.742 
Table 7.   Diameter, average distance, fragmentation and distance-weighted 
fragmentation. 
Table 8 ranks the organizations which, if removed, will fragment the network, and 
it shows by percentage how much this network will be fragmented by removing each 
organization from the network. 
  
211. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 147. 
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Organizations Network Changed 
Fragmentation 
Percent Change in 
Fragmentation (%) 
Muslim Bosnia Army 0.797 0.621 
Kosovo Liberation Army 0.662 0.370 
Al-Gama’at Al-Islamiyya 0.497 0.062 
Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) 
0.496 0.059 
Hezbollah 0.496 0.059 
Table 8.   Node-level fragmentation measures of terror organization-by-organization 
network. 
Furthermore, based on the scores of the centralization measures, this network is 
characterized as relatively decentralized. Also, eigenvector centralization is relatively 
high, which can be interpreted as most important organizations are well connected to 
each other (Table 9). This makes sense, because most of their members participated in 















35.918% 69.21% 35.86% 61.75% 
Table 9.   Centralization scores of terror organization-by-organization network. 
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a. Centrality Measures 
Regarding centrality measures (Table 10), the Muslim Bosnia Army appears as 
the most central organization, which may be due to the fact that its members participated 
in the Kosovo war as well. Also, the Armed Islamic Group and Al-Gamaát Al-Islamiyya 
have a high centrality measure, because many members of these organizations were most 
likely part of El Mujahideen units in Bosnia, and later in the Kosovo war. This means that 
they have had a significant influence amongst the people in the region. The Roubaix 
gang212 appears as a central organization as well. The terror activities in the Balkans are 
intended not only to spread radical Islam there, but also outside the Balkans.213 
  
212. Main members of this group were French, i.e., Christophe Caze and Lionel Dumont, who were 
convinced by Abual Maáli in Islam and fought for the Mujahidin in Bosnia. After the war in Bosnia they 
established this Islamic terror organization in France in order to support extremists in Algeria. 
213. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 154. 
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7th Muslim Brigade 
(42.954) 



















Table 10.   Normalized centrality measures of terror organization-by-organization 
network. 




Figure 17.  Eigenvector centrality in terror organization-by-organization network 
visualized in NetDraw. 
 
Figure 18.  Betweenness centrality in terror organization-by-organization network 
visualized in NetDraw. 
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Figure 19.  Closeness centrality in terror organization-by-organization network visualized 
in NetDraw. 
 




Analyzing subgroups, UCINET identified one main component of the 
organization network that consists of 32 nodes (which is 91.4 percent of the network). 
This component is visualized by NetDraw (Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21.  Main component of organization network (shown in red) visualized in 
NetDraw. 
By using ORA’s Measure Charts five terror organizations were recognized as 
Boundary Spanners,214 and they are the Muslim Bosnia Army, Kosovo Liberation Army, 
National Liberation Army, GIA and Hezbollah.215 They were visualized by ORA and are 
shown in blue in Figure 22.  
214. Boundary Spanners are actors, whose removal may or may not “disconnect the network or 
components of it.” 
215. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 269. 
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Figure 22.  Boundary Spanners of organization-by-organization network, visualized in 
ORA. 
c. Key Players 
By using the UCINET Key Player algorithm, as shown in Table 11, terror 
organizations were found as key players and as reached criterion key players. Both are 
visualized in Figures 23 and 24. 
 
Key Players-Resulting Fragmentation 
0.951 
Reached Criterion 
(No. of distinct organizations reached by 
the key players: 34  (97.1% of network)) 
Muslim Bosnian Army Kosovo Liberation Army 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 
Kosovo Liberation Army Muslim Bosnian Army 
7th Muslim Brigade Al Qaida 




Figure 23.  Key players’ Fragmentation visualized in blue in NetDraw of organization-by-
organization network. 
 




The scores associated with key players indicate that the network fragmentation 
after their removal will be 0.951. This explains the decrease in terror events at the end of 
the first decade of this century, after the 7th Muslim Brigade and KLA were disbanded. 
3. Conclusions from SNA Analyses 
The main conclusions that can be made on the basis of SNA analyses of terror 
organizations operating in the Balkans over the last 20 years include the following: 
• A strong influence by terrorist organizations operating outside the Balkans 
existed in this area. These organizations included GIA, al-Qaeda, Al-
Gama’at Al-Islamiyya and Hezbollah. This is explained by the fact that a 
large part of the warriors during the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo have been 
members of Balkans terror organizations.  
• Another important characteristic of the mode of operation of the 
organizations is that the Balkans were used as a zone for training and for 
disseminating radical Islam. This led to the formation of many terrorist 
organizations operating outside the Balkans. Among these groups, which 
were part of this analysis, are the Milan Terror Cell, Roubaix Terror Cell, 
Montreal Terror Cell and the Paris Metro Terror Cell.216 
 
E. DATA FUSION 
Terror activities in the Balkans have decreased at the end of the analyzed period 
of time. During that period most of the terror events have been outside of Bulgaria’s 
borders. Social network analyses on the individual level showed that many of the key and 
most central individuals were not local but members of other terrorist organizations, 
indicating that there has been strong external influence among the population of Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. On the other hand, the existence of foreign terror 
organizations in these four countries shows that their idea is to use this area for 
promoting radical Islam, for training and then for spreading their activity in the world. In 
other words, although Everton has cautioned that “social network analysis should not be 
seen as a silver bullet or substitute for other critical elements in the decision process,”217 
the SNA conducted on both the individual and organizational level provide strong 
216. Kohlmann, Al Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, 207. 
217. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 45. 
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evidence that the Balkans have been used as an area for military training and recruitment 
of radical Islamists, as well as a “springboard” for terrorism outside the Balkans.218 
Although the analyzed extremists and terror organizations have not been actively 
operating in the territory of Bulgaria, it can be deduced that the potential risk for 
spreading Islamic radicalism and extremism in the country exists. Its dissemination could 
happen both coming from the aforementioned four countries and from terror 
organizations outside the Balkans, i.e., Al Qaeda, GIA, Al-Gama’a Al-Islammiyya and 
Hezbollah. 
  
218. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 123‒177. 
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V. STRATEGIC OPTIONS  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a counterterrorism strategy that Bulgaria 
could pursue in order to prevent future terror activities in its territory. The developed 
strategies derive from the analyses completed in the previous chapter. Three basic 
strategies are recommended and discussed in the following sections. 
A. STRATEGY 1: LAW ENFORCEMENT NON-MILITARY STRATEGY TO 
COUNTER THE SPREAD OF EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION IN 
BULGARIA 
As seen from the analyses, terrorist networks, operated mainly in Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Macedonia and Albania during the analyzed period, are characterized by the strong 
influence and participation of extremists and terrorist organizations outside the Balkans. 
In addition, central individuals in individual networks are mainly extremists, who are 
veterans of the war in Afghanistan, and members of terrorist organizations in North 
Africa and the Middle East, such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, GIA and Al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya. There are significant trends in their mode of operation for dissemination of 
radical Islam among the population in Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia. They 
have been using these countries as bases in which they train extremists in order to spread 
radical Islam in Europe and outside of the continent. Based on these findings, one 
Bulgarian strategy is to increase border control and prevent the penetration of radical 
Islamists into Bulgaria. This strategy requires police and intelligence services to be active 
in data collection and the monitoring of potential places for recruitment of radical 
Islamists, such as mosques and schools, as well as in tracking the links between criminal 
organizations and radical extremists. Also, the government needs to demonstrate its 
power in processing court cases against suspected radicals and extremists in order to 
deter others from joining the terrorists. 
 61 
B. STRATEGY 2: FINANCIAL NON-MILITARY STRATEGY TO 
PREVENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT COMING FROM TERROR AND 
CHARITY ORGANIZATIONS INTO BULGARIA  
Analyses showed that this terror network can be characterized as a network 
operating with significant support coming from outside of the Balkans. This support is 
not only based on warriors and weapons but also on financial resources. According to 
Shay, there have been numerous Islamic charity organizations supporting terror 
organizations by “humanitarian aid, mainly through Islamic charities” in the Balkans 
(mainly in Kosovo and Bosnia). In particular, the organization which appeared most 
central in the analysis is the Muslim Bosnian Army.219 “Although the funds were 
designated solely for humanitarian needs,” Shay said, “in actual fact much of the funding, 
which came from the Muslim world, found its way to guerilla and terror movements and 
strengthened the Balkan terror organizations during the war and in its aftermath.”220 “A 
CIA report written in 1996 pointed out about fifty Islamic charities in the Balkans, a third 
of which were connected to Islamic terror organizations such as Al Qaeda, the Egyptian 
Jamaah al Islamiyah, Algerian terror organizations, the Hamas and Hezbollah.”221 Thus, 
this strategy calls for an approach to monitor asset flows in the country, charitable 
support and bank accounts. In order to achieve this, Bulgaria should also increase its 
international cooperation in tracking the funds of international terror organizations.  
C. STRATEGY 3. KINETIC MILITARY STRATEGY  
This strategy is directed at central terrorists and central terror organizations found 
in the analyses. These central actors have to be removed from the networks by capturing, 
killing or by disrupting the links between them.222 The people found to be most central 
(with rankings based on centrality measures scores in the analyses) and the most 
influential among the others are Sakib Mahmujilin, Anwaar Shaaban, Abdul Qadir 
Mukhtari and Christophe Caze. The most central organizations are the Bosnian Muslim 
219. Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, 50‒64. 
220. Ibid., 46. 
221. Ibid., 49. 
222. Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 4. 
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Army and Kosovo Liberation Army. Also, this strategy can be directed at the highly 
ranked actors (individuals and organizations) in terms of their fragmentation measures, 
key player scores and cut points scores. Since these organizations operate outside of 
Bulgaria, this strategy can be pursued by Bulgaria only under the control and aegis of the 
United Nations or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 
accordance with UN regulations and rules of international law.223 
D. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR SELECTING THE MOST 
EFFECTIVE STRATEGY 
The recommended strategies are assessed by the Analytical Hierarchy Process, 
which is “a process for developing a numerical score to rank each decision alternative 
based on how well each alternative meets the decision maker’s criteria.”224 In order to 
compare these strategies, the following five criteria are used:  
1. Limitation of Civil Liberties. Will this strategy pose some threat for civil 
liberties in Bulgaria and create conditions for ethnic tensions in the 
country?  
2. Available Resources for Implementation. Does Bulgaria have the potential 
to conduct the strategy?  
3. Potential threats to people and critical infrastructure. Will this strategy 
create risks for the population of the country?  
4. Limitations of Implementation of a Strategy. For example, will this 
strategy have a legal basis for implementation in terms of national and 
international legislation? 
5. Potential Effectiveness of a Strategy. If successful, to what extent can the 
strategy prevent future terror activities and radicalization of the 
population?  
223. Ministry of Defense of Republic of Bulgaria, “Concept for Bulgaria’s participation in operations 
for peacekeeping,” 
http://www.md.government.bg/bg/doc/tema/missions_operations/docs/Concept_Peacekeeping.pdf 
224. William Fox, “Models of Conflict” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Winter 
2013) 
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Preferences for the use of each criterion evaluate how important each strategy is. 
Standard preferences and the levels of their importance are shown in Table 12. 
 
Preference Level Numerical Value 
Equally preferred 1 
Moderately preferred 3 
Strongly  preferred 5 
Very strongly preferred 7 
Extremely preferred 9 
2, 4, 6, 8 For compromises between above 
Table 12.   Standard preference table. 
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Strategy 1 0.231614 0.311284 0.136221 0.622741 0.615417 
Strategy 2 0.696531 0.622741 0.648664 0.311284 0.078434 
Strategy 3 0.071855 0.065975 0.215115 0.065975 0.306149 
Table 14.   Matrix of averages for all criterions. 
Table 15 shows the matrix of the ranking of all criteria with a calculated 




















1 1/5 1/3 1/2 1/7 0.0491 
Available 
Resources 
5 1 3 4 1/3 0.2531 
Potential 
Threats 




2 1/4 2 1 1/6 0.1027 
Potential 
Effectiveness 
7 3 5 6 1 0.4999 
Table 15.   Ranked criteria in order of importance. 
As seen in Table 15 potential effectiveness (almost 50 percent) is the most 
important criterion followed by available resources, limitations of implementation, 
potential threats and limitations of civil liberties. 
After multiplication of the criteria matrix by the preference vector matrix the 




Strategy 1 0.474795 
Strategy 2 0.324698 
Strategy 3 0.200507 
Table 16.   Ranked strategies. 
Table 16 shows how each strategy ranks. These rankings are as follows: Strategy 
1 ‒ 48 percent, Strategy 2 ‒ 32 percent and Strategy 3 ‒ 20 percent. Based on these scores 
Bulgaria could pursue the law enforcement approach in order to prevent potential 
radicalization and extremism on its territory. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
International terrorism appears to be one of the most critical challenges facing the 
world. After the events of September 11, the London bombing, Madrid bombing and so 
on, terrorism has become a strategic threat to world peace. Bulgaria has not been spared 
from terror attacks, as the terror bombing that targeted Israeli tourists at the Burgas 
airport in 2012 showed. Although this attack was directed at Israelis, it clearly was a 
breach in Bulgaria’s national security.225  
A. THESIS PURPOSE REVIEW 
The purpose of this thesis was to illustrate how a data collection and data analysis 
process could assist Bulgaria in developing a counterterrorism strategy to increase its 
national security. The “recommended strategy” is only illustrative since it relies on 
limited open-source data and dated historical documents. Thus, the real contribution of 
the thesis is its demonstration of how to develop strategy using new methodological 
tools—link analysis, geospatial analysis, temporal analysis and social network analysis. 
For example,  
• Geospatial analysis of the Balkans is used to visualize ethnic distribution 
in the Balkans, and the latter to visualize geospatially terrorist events over 
the period 1991 to 2013; 
• Temporal analysis is used to visualize different types of terror events 
throughout various time periods and countries conducted by using the 
Palantir software; 
• Link analysis is employed to describe various connections between 
people, terrorist events, and terrorist organizations; 
• Social network analysis using ORA and UCINET programs visualize the 
terror networks and their connections. Based on this analysis, the modes 
and trends of operation of the terror groups in Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania 
and Macedonia can be highlighted.  
  
225Nikolay Slatinski, “Report: Counterterrorism—Problems, lessons and conclusions,” Rakovski 
Defense and Staff College, Sofia, Bulgaria, http://nslatinski.org/?q=bg/node/431 
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• Data fusion of all the analyses can provide a common operational picture 
to inform the development of counterterrorism strategies. 
• And finally, the analytical hierarchical process can be used as a decision-
making tool to evaluate strategic options and, based on the desired criteria, 
identify a preferred strategy.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analytical process outlined in this thesis is recommended to develop 
Bulgaria’s counterterrorist strategies. To support this analytical process, the following 
resources and capabilities are required. Intelligence data need to be collected and 
structured. Personnel need to be trained in data collection, data structuring and data 
analysis. Most importantly, data analysis needs to include the use of new methodological 
tools (e.g., link analysis, geospatial and temporal analyses and social network analysis). 
With these resources and capabilities, Bulgaria would be well positioned to develop data-
driven strategies to prevent attacks that threaten its future security.    
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